![]() ![]() ![]() The actions of Marine Corps units in the central Pacific campaign are used as the sample for this assessment. This article discusses how Army technology purchased by the Marine Corps Equipment Board in 1938 hastily forced the Corps to also implement tank doctrine on Army operational principles. Tarawa, therefore, became the single point at which the Marine Corps’ doctrine and principles of tank warfare began to develop differently from the Army’s concept of armored warfare. It forced the Marine Corps to modify its tactics and techniques. During the Battle of Tarawa, coordination between infantry and armor was essential to survival. The Marine Corps later recognized that independent tank operations in restricted island terrain against an entrenched enemy was fatal for many tankers. This tactic was designed for Army units fighting in the terrain of Europe and North Africa, where an enemy armored threat was more prevalent. Army units were organized into units that extended from the four-tank armored platoon up to an entire armored division, as dictated by the recently published Army doctrine. 9 As a result, the first Marine tank crews were trained to operate in independent armored formations. 8 The shortcomings of the Army’s tank doctrine to support the seizure of advanced bases resulted in a dramatic resource-and casualty-intensive progression of Marine Corps tank doctrine throughout operations in the Pacific theater that started at the Battle of Tarawa.Īt the start of fighting in the Pacific, Marine Corps doctrine regarding the role of tanks in an amphibious assault-outlined in the Tentative Landing Operations Manual of 1934-was vague. The Army’s armored tactics, however, were not designed to operate in the Pacific theater, where close infantry coordination was necessary, but rather were designed for independent armored formations. The Army’s way of armored warfare became the foundation of Marine Corps tank unit structure and education. With this procurement of technology, the Army provided the Marine Corps its tactical and organizational doctrine and training at the Army’s tank school. 6 As a quick and economic solution, the Marine Corps Equipment Board purchased tank technology from the U.S. 5 After the outrage over losses during the Gallipoli campaign in 1915, these two problems had to be solved, and they overshadowed the incorporation of tanks into amphibious operations. Of higher priority, however, were developing systems to synchronize naval gunfire and develop- ing an amphibious tractor to land troops. After World War I and throughout the interwar period, the leadership of the Marine Corps recognized that armored forces would be an important factor to support the seizure of advanced bases and islands. 4 These failures were the catalyst for doctrinal and technological changes that affected future Marine Corps campaigns in the Pacific theater of operations. ![]() 3 Commanding officers in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) acknowledged improvements must be made to correct the problems encountered on Betio Island, among them the ineffective employment of tanks. 2 The American public demanded that Marine Corps leaders be held accountable for what they considered a catastrophic military failure. Armored forces in particular took upwards of 86 percent losses-the result of poor communication, poor planning, and ineffective firepower. When the battle ended, it cost the 2d Marine Division 3,301 casualties in only three days of combat. In November 1943, crisis shifted the doctrinal paradigm for the U.S. Over time, these principles become the paradigm for how units function, enabling troops and commanders to act quickly against foreseeable threats. It is the frame of reference used by soldiers and leaders to organize, train, and fight. Doctrine provides solutions to tactical or operational problems.
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